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The thesis presents a simple bargaining model with
'outsiders' under incomplete information. The buyer wants to buy
a good which two sellers sell.- The sellers are of two types:
'hard' and 'soft'. The buyer assigns subjective probability to
the types of sellers. The sellers are ex ante independent and
identical to the buyer. The buyer gives an offer, if the first
seller accepts, the process terminates. If the seller rejects,
the buyer can give higher offers to him or switches to the second
one, the process terminates until the seller accepts. The buyer
is risk neutral. Then there are only two optimal strategies: one
is 'stopping' strategy, i.e., gives an offer that all type
sellers will accept one is 'fixed-offer' strategy, i.e., gives
an offer that only 'soft' sellers will accept, and switches to
other sellers if the offer is rejected until the last seller.
If the discount factor increases, or the subjective probability
of meeting the 'soft' seller(s) increases, then the probability
of using 'fixed-offer' increases. Surprisingly, the condition
for choosing different strategies is the same as in one seller
case. Compare with one seller case, the buyer is better off in
choosing 'fixed-offer' strategy, the 'soft' seller is indifferent
and the 'hard' seller is worse off. The model has been extended
to various directions, the cases with more than two sellers, with
more than one buyer, with different discount cost structure of
buyer(s), with switching cost, with multi-type sellers, with ex
ante non-identical sellers, with identical seller, with risk-
averse buyers and the sellers may make strategic delay.
certain results have been obtained. The strategies are
independent of the number of sellers if the sellers are ex ante
independent and identical. With switching cost, the buyer will
haggle with the current seller. And the choose of strategies is
also independent of number of sellers. More than one buyer will
make the first seller better off. Haggling with current seller
is still not profitable in multi-type sellers case if the sellers
are ex ante, independent and identical. It is better for the
buyer to announce his strategies if the sellers may make
strategic delay. Recall is profitable only in ex ante non-
identical sellers, and 'stopping' strategy is optimal in all
situations. If the valuation of the first 'hard' seller is the
largest, then only 'stopping', 'switching and haggling' and
'switching and stopping' are optimal. Specification of discount
cost structure is crucial if the buyer is risk-averse. For
certain expected utility functions, the probability of 'stopping'
increases if the buyer is risk-averse in discount factor case,
but is uncertain in fixed discount cost case.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First I wish to thank deeply Dr. Sunny Kwong, my supervisor,
Dr. Liu Pak-wai, and Dr. Lau Man-lui who had read through the
drafts and gave invaluable advices and comments to make the
manuscriot more comohensive.
I am also grateful to all my instructors who have been kind
enough to give me training and guidance in my graduate work.
Besides, I am indebted to my collegues and friends, Mr. Chan
Yue-cheong, Mr. Lo Wai-kin, Mr. Wong Weng-fai, Mr. Yu Ip-wing,
Mr. Chu Kam-hon, Mr. Hui Po-keung, Mr. Victor Hung, Mr. Ng Tung-
lok, and Mr. Sin Chor-yiu for their encouragement and support
during my study.





















563.7 Fixed discount cost and many sellers
573.8 Multi-types sellers
583.9 Strategic delay of sellers
613.10 Strategic delay of sellers with switching cost
633.11 Strategic delay of sellers and two buyers
643.12 Identical sellers
653.13 Ex-ante non-identical sellers
3.14 Ex-ante non-identical sellers with switching cost.. 70
3.15 Risk averse buyer with many sellers 71




In most microeconomic texts, perfect competition is the
standard model for explaining the behavior of agents in the
economy. But the bargaining problem has received considerable
attention in recent years.
Indeed, there are two important reasons why the study of
bargaining is of fundamental importance to economics. The first
is that many aspects of real economic activity are influenced
directly by bargaining among individuals, firms, and nations.
The second is that bargaining can be taken as the opposite pole
of the models of the perfect competition though these two
aDproaches may be combined together (See D.Gale (1986a,b)).
In the perfect competition models, the strategic aspect of
economic interaction is reduced to negligible proportions so that
each agent behaves as a price taker only. But in the
bargaining models, the strategic behaviors of agents determine
the final outcome.
The development of bargaining theory in general can be
divided into three ways. One is the axiomatic approach. This
approach was begun in the celebrated article by J. Nash (1950).
In this approach, theorists try to set up some reasonable
axioms to characterize the behavior of the agents so that under
these axioms, a unique final outcome will be given.
The second way is the cooperative approach. Similar to the
axiomatic approach, the cooperative game form is used. But the
purpose of the analysis (especially with incomplete information)
is to try to explain how regrettable (or ex post inefficient)
outcomes, such as strikes, costly delays, and litigation, can
occur in an efficiently designed social system. Also, the
efficiency of outcomes under different offer strategies is
studied. The last one is the non-cooperative approach. In this
case, theorists will formulate an extensive or strategic form
model for the problem, and identify all equilibria of the model
and discuss the properties of them.
v
Different approaches have different advantages anc
disadvantages. The axiomatic and cooperative methods can get ar
unique outcome. And the uniqueness of outcome generally cannot
be guranteed in the non-cooperative form except in some cases.
But in the non-cooperative form, we can have explicit strategic
behavior of each agent and the bargaining procedure can be
modeled. In some cases, the cooperative game can be taken as a
kind of 'static' game, in such situations, the buyer(s) and the
seller(s) announce their price(s) simultaneously, and optimal
mechanism is proposed. Then the players get what they should have
according to the mechanism and the bargaining process terminates.
But, real-world bargaining is almost always sequential. So in
this sense, the formulation of non-cooperative models are more
realistic. Although the approaches appear to be very different
in spirit, they in fact complement to each other
As suggested by Sutton (1987), this point can be stated
succinctly as follows:
...the detailed process of bargaining must involve some
attempt to distil out some simple principles which will hold over
a wide range of possible processes. What an axiomatic approach
attempts to do is codify some set of principles of this kind. In
order to guide our intuition as to what principles are resonable;
on compelling, we have to study some particular bargaining
processes. Or from an other point of view, the study of such
processes may allow to draw out certain simple principles which
can guide our (re)formulation of the axioms we use, and inform
this application of these axioms....
In this thesis, I will present a non-cooperative model in
which thdre exist outsiders with incomplete information. Until
now, most of the articles presented before are cast in a twoV.
agents( for example, one buyer ana one seller) setting, or with
complete information. Only a few articles concern the problem of
this type (Riley-Zeckhauser (1983), Fudenberg et al. (1987)).
But in many situations, outside opportunities can be obtained by
the agents, so studying the properties of the optimal strategies
of the agents and the equilibria will be important.
In chapter II, I give a survey of bargaining theory
especially of the non-cooperative models under incomplete
information with outsiders. In chapter III, my main model and
its extensions will be presented fully. Summary and conclusion
are in the last chapter.
Chapter II
Survey
2.1. The Axiomatic Approach
There are two underlying questions motivating the study of
the axiomatic solutions to bargaining problems. The first
purpose is prediction. We attempt to answe'r the question: which
feasible outcome would the rational agents arrive at their own if
commitments and contracts were possible among the them? The
second is to attempt to answer the question: which outcome
should an arbitrator choose? Thus, the relevance of various
solutions to the questions may be tested through testing the
underlying axioms against intuition. Also, as mentioned before,
unique solution will be chosen through a small number of simple
conditions.
The pioneer article in this area is Nash (1950). According
to Kalai (1986), we can formulate the models in the following
way: Formally a two-person bargaining game can be described as a
pair (d,S) where d R2 and S£.R2 and assume that the pair (d,S)
satisfies the following conditions.
1. dcS
2. S is compact and convex
3. There is at least one u S with u d.
We let B be the set of all bargaining games satisfying these
three conditions. The elements of S, the feasible set, are the
utility pairs that the agents can receive under cooperation if
they reach a unanimous agreement. The disagreement point (threat
point or status quo point) d is the utility pair the agents have
when no agreement is made.
Given a bargaining pair (d,S) and a point u 6 R2, we say
that u is individually rational if ud, and strongly individual
rational if ud. And u is Pareto optimal if u 6 S and for every
w 6 S if wu, then w=u.
A solution is a function f: B— R2 such that for every
(d,S)6 B, f(d,S)£ S. And we assume that both agents have von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions so that the solutions are
independent of individual-specific affine transformations in
utility scales. Let p:R2-- R2 such that p(x,y)= (y, x). A
solution f is called symmetric if for every (d,S)6 B, p(f(d,S))=
f(p(d),p(S)) where p(S)= {p(u):u£ S}.
Now we define the Nash solution. The Nash solution is the
function N: B-- R2, which selects the individual rational
utility pair with a maximal Nash product, (u-d)(u2-d2). Thus
the objective of the Nash solution is to maximize the product of
the utility gains of the agents. Since the feasible set is
compact and convex, the Nash solution exists ana unique.
Another point we need to bring forth is a rationale
underlying the Nash solution. We say that a solution is
independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if for every two
bargining pairs (d,S) and (d,T) with S C T if f(d,T)£ S, then
f(d,S)=f(d,T). There are two ways to view this consistency
condition. Starting with the pair (d,T) and its solution f(d,T),
imagine that the feasible set was reduced in size to S yet the
solution f(d,T) is still feasible. Then we require that it
remains the solution in the smaller set. Or, starting with a
feasible set of alternatives S and its solutions f(d,S) and
assuming that some new additional alternatives become available,
we require that the choice in the new set be either f(d,S) or one
of the new alternatives. Now we state the theorem in Nash
(1 Qsrn.
Theorem: A solution is Pareto optimal, symmetric
independent of irrelevant alternatives, and independent of affin
transformations in utilitv scales iff it is the Nash solution.
Some other solutions such as Kalai-Smorodinsky, Maschler
Perles, the utilitarian and the egalitarian solutions have beei
proposed which are characterized by different axioms.
The above result can be generalized to a n-person case. W
fix n to be a positive integer greater than 1, and define the se
of n-person bargaining pairs, Bn, in the same way as before. Th
definitions of individually rationality, Pareto optimal, strongl
individual rational, independent of irrelevant alternatives, an
independent of affine transformations in utility scales ar
modified in the natural way by replacing R2 with Rn. Now w
define the n-person non-symmetric Nash solution. It is thi
function f: Bn— R such that for some ,B2»••• »n)0, W(
have for every (d,S)£ Bn, f(d,S) is the unique point in th
individual rational part of S that maximizes the non-symmetric
Nash product (u-d)1 (U2~d2)... (un-dn)n. Now we state the
result (See Harsanvi and Selten MQ7?n
Theorem: An n-person solution is Pareto optimal, strongly
individual rational, independent of irrelevant alternatives, and
independent of affine transformations in utility scales iff it is
a nob-symmetric Nash solution.'
2.2. The Cooperative Game as Mechanism Design
In recent years, the study of mechanism design has received
a great deal of attention. The basic procedure in this study is
to examine the set of all bargaining solutions which could be
realized as the equilibrium of a bargaining process. This set of
outcomes is then examined for the presense of solutions which
satisfy certain interesting properties.. This approach shares
with the axiomatic approaches, an interest in the properties of
the bargaining solutions. However, it differs in that interest
is specifically restricted to bargaining solutions which could be
achieved as Nash equilibrium of a bargaining process (Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in incomplete information cases). Then it provides a
some basis for examining the choice of various noncooperative
bargaining process.
Since there may be many potential outcomes of the bargaining
process, then which solutions need to be identified is a
question. So the economists use the following approach. First,
a cooperative transformation of the bargaining process, by adding
communication or contract signing options with an arbitrator (or
mediator, social planner), is made. An arbitrator is any person
or machine that can help the players communicate. Now we can
consider a formulation of a bargaining problem.
In Myerson (1979a), a general problem of an arbitrator
trying to select a collective choice for a group of individuals
with incomplete information is considered. Formally, the
arbitrator's problem is described by a Bayesian collective choice
problem, of the form (C,Ax,A2,...,An.Uj,U2 Un'p) whose
components are interpreted as follows. The players are numbered
l,2,...,n. C is the set of choices available to the group. For
each players i, A- is the set of possible types for him. That
is, teach a 6 A- represents a complete description of player i's
relevant characteristics: his preference, beliefs, abilities, and
endowments. Each Uj is a utility function from CxAxA2x...xAn
into the real numbers such that each (c ,a,a2,.. .an) is the
payoff whch player i would get if c£ C were chosen and if
(a-L,a2,... ,an) were the true vector of player types. Each is
von Neumann-Morgenstern type utility functions. Finally, P is a
probability distribution on A}XA2x.. .xAjj such that Pfa- ,a2,.. .an)
is the probability as judged by the arbitrator that
(a-L, a2,..., an) is the true vector of types for the n players. We
assume C and all Aj_ are nonempty finite sets. However, we will
admit randomized strategies instead of selecting particular
choice in C, the arbitrator may select a probability distribution
over C which is deterimined randomly according to this
distribution.
The arbitrator's solution to this problem would typically be
procedure in which he first asks every player for some
information about his type independently, and then selects a
choice in C, or a probability distribution over C, using the
information which the players have given him. Then, the choice
mechanism by the arbitrator is a real-valued function p with a
domain of the form Cx(A1xA2x.. .xAj) such that
and for all c and every (ai ,a?,... ,an) in
Now one of the problems facing the arbitrator is that since
the arbitrator cannot force the players to give truthful
responses, so he must design choice mechanisms such that no
player would have any incentive to lie to the arbitrator when all
other players are expected to be honest. Then this choice
mechanism p is said to be Bayesian incentive-compatible
mechanismsNote that any equilibrium of the transformed
Bayesian collective choice problem must be equivalent to some
incentive-compatible mechanism. (This is the revelation
principle. For the formal proof of this principle, see Myerson
(1979b)).
If choice mechanism p is used and if everyone is honest,
then player i's conditionally-expected payoff when he knows a is
V(p|a). The allocation of conditionally-expected payoffs
associated with mechanism p is then the vector
V(p)= (V1 (p| a-j),..., Vn(p| an)). Then, the incentive-feasible set F
of expected allocation vectors is defined as F={V(p):p is
Bayesian incentive-compatible).
Now we restrict our attention to Bayesian incentive-
compatible mechanisms. Also, the arbitrator certainly would not
use a mechanism p if it were strictly dominated by another
available mechanism p, in the sense that VA(p|aj)V±(p1|aA) for
all i and a in, by another incentive-compatible mechanism p'.
So we define p to be incentive efficient iff it is a Bayesian
incentive-compatiable choice mechanism and is not strictly
dominated by any other Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism.
Now we can transform the collective choice problem to become
a bargaining problem, by specifying a conflict outcome (or
disagreement point) c in C. Associated with the conflict
outcome c is the conflict payoff vector t and t will belong to
F. Now we have a feasible set F and a reference point t in F.
Let F+ be the set of all incentive-feasible payoff vectors which
are individually rational, i.e., no player of any type expects to
do worse than in the conflict outcome. Following Harsanyi and
Selten (1972), the incentive-feasible bargaining solution is
vector x F+ which maximizes the generalized Nash product
TUx-t)i over the set F (See section 2.1). Then the following
result can be proved. Suppose that c is not incentive
efficient, then there exists a unique incentive-feasible Nash
harcra i n i n«r solution.
In the above Nash and Myerson models, the bargaining problem
is in a form of 'dividing a cake'. There exists a fixed amount
of certain object (cake), and the players (two or more than two)
try to divide the 'cake' among them. In the axiomatic approach,
thpv HiuiHp the' nake' according: to the axioms. In the
cooperative game, a coordinator may existand an optimal mechanism
is proposed. Besides this type of models, there is another type
of models. They are in the form of 'bilateral trading'. In these
models, there are two parties, one is the buyer(s) and the other
is the seller(s). The seller(s) has(have) object(s) to sell
which the buyer(s) wants(want). Price(s) is(are) announced by
eithier-side, or alternatively, or simultanedusly by both sides.
One pioneerjarticle in studying mechanism design using the form
of bilateral trading is Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
In this paper, the following trading problem is considered.
A seller owns an object that a buyer wants to buy. They both
have independent valuations which are random variables from
probability distributions. Each individual knows his own
valuation at the beginning, but he considers the other's
valuation as a random variable. Thus, to guarantee that each
individual is willing to participate in a bargaining mechanism,
the individual rationality constraint is added. Each individual
has nonnegative expected gains from trade in the mechanism,
regardless of his given valuation. Finally, the individuals are
assumed to be risk neutral.
A direct bargaining mechanism is one in which each
individual simultaneously reports his valuation to a coordinator
who then determines whether the object is transferred, and how
much the buyer must pay. And the direct mechanism is incentive-
compatible if honest reporting form a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium(
as suggested in Myerson1s (1979) model). So, by using the
revelation principle, the authors only concern the incentive-
compatible direct mechanism. Then the definition of ex post
efficiency is given. In an ex post efficient mechanism, the
buyer gets the object whenever his valuation is higher, and the
seller keeps the object whenever his valuation is higher. Then
the following result can be proved. The equilibrium will not
either with balance budget (i.e., the sum of payoffs of both
buyer and seller equals to the potential gains from agreement) or
ex post efficient if it is individually rational.
2.3. The Non-cooperative Approach
One of the forerunner who studied bargaining using non-
cooperative method is Rubinstein.
The Rubinstein's (1982) model is a case of two-person
bargaining under complete information. It can be stated as
follows: Two agents set out to divide a 'cake' of size 1 between
them. If they agree, each receives his agreed share, and if they
fail to agree, both receive zero.
A simple bargaining process involves the parties taking
turns to make proposals. At time 0, player I proposes that he
receive some share, x. Player II immediately replies Yes or
No. If he says Yes the game ends; otherwise, at time 1,
Player II makes a proposal to which Player I immediately replies;
and so on. The payoff to Player I (Player II) equals his share
of the cake as agreed at time t, multiplied by fi1i:(resP-
where B» 2 represent discount factors. To provide incentive
for the players to reach an agreement, we assume B|,B21. A
strategy for Player I specifies his proposalreply at each point,
as a function of the history of the game up to that point. An
equilibrium is a Perfect Equilibrium if the strategies induced by
all players in every subgame form is a Nash Equilibrium in that
subgame.
Then it was shown that, in this game, there is a unique
partition of the 'cake', which can be supported as a Perfect
Equilibrium. In this equilibrium, agreement is immediate,
although the process Is allowed to be infinite, and Player I
receives share (I-B2)() while Player II receives share
(1-i)()• To show this, we follow the proof of Shaked
and Sutton (1984):
Let M denote the supremum of the share which Player I can
obtain in any perfect equilibrium of this game. Now consider the
subgame beginning with an offer made by Player I at time t=2.
Notice that this subgame has the same structure as the original
game apart from a supremum of the share which Player I can obtain
in any perfect equilibrium of the game is again M.
Now consider the offer made by II in the preceding period.
Any offer which gives I a share of more than SM, being the
discounted value to him of a share M received one period later,
will certainly be accepted. So the share of the 'cake' which II
obtains in any perfect equilibrium cannot be less than 1-BM; in
fact, this is the infimum of II's share in this subgame. Now
consider I's offer at t=0. Any offer by I which gives II a share
less than will certainly be rejected. Hence, Player I
will obtain at most a share of the 'cake' equal; in
fact, this represents the supremum of what Player I will receive
in any perfect equilibrium, that is, it equals M. So,
we obtain
But the preceding argument can now be repeated, but with M
defined instead as the infimum of the share received by Player I
in any perfect equilibrium of the game; with the words moreless,
mostleast, acceptedrejected, and supremuminfiraum interchangec
throughout. Hence, the solution is in fact supported as a
perfect equilibrium, and so there exists a unique Perfect
Equilibrium Partition. The above result has the intuitively
appealing feature that the more impatient a player, the smaller
his share of the 'cake'. It also has the feature that there is
an Advantage to moving first; for example, where Bi=B2=B,
player I receives 1(1+B).
In the complete information model just discussed, the
equilibrium strategies imply immediate agreement. But in
practice, such complete information is unlikely to be available.
So, we have to examine the non-cooperative bargaining models with
incomplete information.
The first requirement in constructing a model of bargaining
under incomplete information is to specify the nature of the
incomplete information. Suppose that the buyer is uncertain as
to the seller's reservation price. We then refer to each of the
possible seller's reservation prices as a type of seller. We
must then specify the buyer's belief about the possibility of
each possible type occurring. This is accomplished by
introducing a probability distribution on the potential seller's
types, where this distribution describes the buyer's expectation
of the likelihood of various types.
One of the papers which studied the bilateral trading under
incomplete information is Sobel and Takahashi(1983).
The authors consider a simple asymmetric model of bilateral
monopoly under uncertainty in which a single seller, with one
object to sell, faces a single buyer. The seller announces a
price for object, which the buyer can either accept or reject.
If the offer is accepted, then the object is transferred at the
announced price; otherwise, the process continues with the seller
announcing another price. Since the seller has incomplete
information about the buyer's willingness to pay, then there may
be situations in which the buyer and the seller fail to make a
transaction at the first price even though gains from trade are
available (See Myerson and Satterwaite (1983)). But if the
seller realizes that there are unexploited opportunities for
trade after the first price is rejected, it is reasonable to
assume that the bargaining process should continue until all
potential benefits are exhausted. So, the bargaining is assumed
to take place in multi-stages.
The concepts of equilibrium used in this paper are different
from some other papers. The commitment equilibrium is defined as
the seller who maximizes his expected profits assuming that the
buyer, taking prices announced by the seller as given, buys in
the period that maximizes his discount surplus. In such an
equilibrium, the seller must be able to guarantee that the price
schedule he orginally announces will not be modified in the
future. If the seller does not commit, the non-commitment
equilibria are appropriate. Essentially, these consist of
pricing plans that are optimal from each period forward
conditional on the infomation the seller has learned by the
buyer's previous refusal to make a purchase. Note that
information transmission is involved in non-commitment equilibria
but not in commitment equilibria.
Some results are given in the paper: In particular, the
ability to make commitments will be beneficial to the seller.
Lengthening the bargaining process will hurt both players.
Making one bargainer more impatient need not improve the welfare
of the other if commitment is not possible as it may make
attractive strategies infeasible.
Two limitations of the models are suggested by the authors.
Although comparsion of the expected payoffs in commitment
equilibria to those in non-commitment equilibria gives a measure
of the incentives the seller has to attempt commitment, it would
be more satisfying if the ability to make commitments were
derived endogenously. Another problem is the structure of
bargaining. If both the seller and the buyer are allowed to make
offers with asymmetries in their roles. Some of the results may
be changed.
In another paper written by Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), a
similar model with sequential bargaining under incomplete
information is studied. In this model, a seller has two chances
to sell an indivisible object to a single buyer; both would
prefer a trade today to the same trade tomorrow. The concept of
perfect Bayesian equilibrium is used. Such equilibrium requires
that players update their beliefs about their opponents in
accordance with Bayes rule, and are not misled by empty threats.
If the valuation of the seller is known, the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is unique, while if neither player knows the
valuation of the other, there are multiple equilibria.
A bargaining process with gains from trade to be efficient
if agreement is reached in the first period, weakly inefficient
if agreement is reached, at a later period, and strongly
V
inefficient if agreement is not reached in this paper.
t
The model is formulated as follows: One seller and one
buyer bargain over an indivisible object. At the start of the
bargaining process, each player knows his own valuation (s for
the seller, b for the buyer), but not the valuation of the other
player. He has some probability distribution about it, which is
common knowledge. Valuation includes the possibility of further
transactions with other traders if disagreement occurs. Buyer
w
and seller are assumed to be risk-neutral. In the first period,
the seller makes an offer that the buyer accepts or rejects; if
the buyer rejects the first offer, the seller makes second offer
in the following period. The payoff are [p,b-p](resp. [Bsp,
Bb(bP)]) if agreement at price p is reached in the first(second)
period, where 0Bb,fisl, are the discount factors of the seller
and buyer respectively. If agreement has not been reached after
two periods, the game ends and the payoffs are rBc.s.01.
Then we turn to a formal definition of the equilibrium. The
actions of a seller of type s must be specified. Let ps) be
his first-period offer, and let p2(s,p1) be the second-period
offer if the buyer refuses the offer px. A buyer of type t
accepts the offer p2 with probability r1(p1,b), and in the second
period he accepts p2 with probablity r2(p2,b). An equilibrium is
a set of strategies (px,p2,r1,r2) forming a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium: in each subgame no player can gain by deviating to
another strategy given the strategies of the other players and
his information, the updating of priors being performed accordingt
to Bayes rule. The buyer's second-period equilibrium strategy is
•t
easily computed: he accepts the offer p2 iff p2 does not exceed
b; r2(p2,b)=l if P2b and r2(p2,b)=0 if p2b. The seller's
second-period price maximizes his second-period profit given the
buyer's second-period strategy, using the strategy r1(p1,b) and
p to compute his posterior about the valuation of the buyer.
Let us now consider the strategy of the buyer in the first
period. He observes an offer p. Given the strategy pCs), he
is able to compute a posterior probability distribution for the
valuation s of the seller. This in turn can be combined with
p2(s,p1) to infer a probability distribution for the second-
period offer p2. The buyer b's first-period action r-p-pb)
maximizes his expected discounted payoff given this distribution.
Lastly, we consider seller s's first period action Pi(s). We
require it to maximize seller's expected discounted payoff given
the strategies (r(p,b),r2 (P2b)) and his (potential) second-
period action po(s,pi).
Then the simplest case where the valuation of the seller, s,
is common knowledge is studied. The incomplete information
aspect of the bargaining process is limited to the uncertainty
the seller faces about the valuation of thp buyer. We assume
that there are two types of potential buyers, with
valuation b_and b (bb). The seller has prior (12,12). So the
offer will be between b and b_. We consider only the case sbj
the case sb_ is trivial as the seller sets Pi=P2=k.- We shall
denote by [(p) ,i?2(p2)] and [r1 (p), r2 (P2)] the strategies of
the buyer b_ and b respectively. Given the first-period
strategies rj.(Pi) ri(Pi) in the case of rejection of p, the
seller will compute a posterior [g_(p) ,q(Pi)=l-g_(Pi)] by simple
Bayesian updating (where q_(Pi) the updated probability of
facing buyer bj. p2(Pi) will denote the seller's second-period
offer if he charged p in the first period. Since P2 will
actually take the values b_ and b, we will describe it as a
random variable with 02(Pi)=Pr[p2(Pi)=b]. Then there are two
types of equilibria for the two-period game depending on the
solution of the following one-period game.
The one-period game is as follows: The seller makes an
offer that the buyer accepts or rejects. If b(b+s)2, the
seller announces b_and the buyer accepts, whatever his type. In
this case the seller will be called a soft seller. If
_b(b+s)2, the seller announces b, and the buyer accepts iff he
is of the type the seller is then called a tough seller.
And the borderline cases, b=(b+s)2 is ignored.
In the two-period game, the buyer's equilibrium second-
period strategies are the same as in the one-period game: each
buyer accepts all offers less than or equal to his valuation. So
£l(Pl)=l for Pilk; 0 otherwise. Thus of the buyer's strategies
we need only consider r-jjpi).
Next we introduce some useful definitions for the
chracteriztion of equilibrium. Let b~ be the highest first-
period price buyer b will pay when he expects that p2 will be b_:
b~= (l-Bs)b+ Gsb_. Let r be the value of r which makes a tough
seller just indifferent between playing soft and tough in the
second period when r1=0 (i.e. the buyer with valuation b rejects
at the first period): r=(b+ s-2b)(b-bj. Finally, let
p(b~)=l2b~+l2£sb_ be the seller's profit when Pi=b~ (since b
accepts b~); and let p(b,r) be the seller's profit when Pi=b and
P1(b)=r. And if p is refused, the seller plays b_(soft) with
probability 02(Pi)-
Proposition: When the buyer has complete information about
the seller, there exists a unique Bayesian equilibrium. If the
seller is soft, he always plays b_ in the second period (2=1)
and pa is either b or b~. If the seller is tough, and max (p(bj,
p(b~)) p(b,r), the outcome is the same as with a soft seller.
If p(b,r) max (p(y, p(b~)), then p=b, r1(b)=r, and 92(b)=0.
Proof. We first remark that in any period, buyer b_ refuse
any offer higher than b, and that any offer (less than or) equa
to b_is accepted by any buyer, as the seller never charges les
than b_ in the second period. Now assume the seller is soft
Then if the first period offer P} has been rejected, the seller'
posterior is such that gpl. This in turn implies that th
seller plays soft in the second period:
_b_ l2b+l2s=== b q(Pi Jb+p) s.
Buyer b, anticipating the seller's second-period offer of b, wil
accept the first-period offer iff
b-pi Bg(b-b)=== p Bgb+(1—Bg)b=b.
Thus the seller won't consider first-period offers above b~. W
can conclude that there are two first-period offers which ca
arise in equilibrium, b_ and b~. (Offers in between do no
increase the probability of agreement, and thus are dominated b
b~ from the point of view of the seller.) The expected payoff
for the seller are:
p(y=b and p(b~)=l2b~+l2Bsb_.
It is easy to check that there are parameter values which make
either payoff larger, and so either equilibrium can occur.
Now assume the seller is tough. Consider the strategy of
buyer b in the first period. First, regardless of the seller's
strategy in the second period, he will be willing to accept any
offer less than or equal to b~. Consider any offer Pi exceeding
b. If buyer b played r(p)T, the seller would play soft in
the second period, and it would pay for b to refuse p, a
contradication. Suppose now that buyer b played ri(Pi)r. Then
the seller would be tough in the second period, and buyer b would
be better off accepting P} (since p1b). Thus for bp1b, the
only possible equilibrium strategy for buyer b in the first
period is the mixed strategy: r1(p1)=r. But in order to be
willing to play a mixed strategy, buyer b must be indifferent
between accepting and refusing the first-period offer p1.
Remember now that r1(p1)=r: means the seller is indifferent
between playing tough and soft in the second period. If 02(Pi)
is the probability of playing soft in the second period, buyer b
is indifferent in the first neriod iff:
b-p1=e2(Pl)BB~y=== 92(Pi)= (b-p1)(BB(b-y)
Thus there exist unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium
stra tetri es.
From looking at buyer b's first-period strategy, we can see
that the best strategy for the- seller in the first period is to
choose one of three offers (b_,b~,B), as r(Pi) is constant over





Any of these payoffs may be the largest, depending on the
parameters.
In this model, we can identify some important features of
the bargaining process. First we examine the case of soft
seller.
1. There is an adverse selection phenomenon in that the
seller's prior will dictate his behaviour. In general, a buyer
is better off if the seller believes he is not very eager to buy.
2. Agreement need not occur in the first period, even in a
situation where agreement would always be reached in a one-period
bargaining process. Thus extending the horizon may decrease the
efficiencyvof the process.
3. Concessions may arise in perfect equilibrium even if
buyers are risk-neutral (p1=b). If the buyer and the seller
have identical bargaining costs (Bg=Bg), the best strategy for
the seller is to announce a fixed price (Pi=b_? P2=b). When the
buyer is more impatient than the seller, the non-haggling
result may not be hold.
4. A lower discount factor of the buyer increases b~, and
makes offer more attractive to the seller. Thus apart from the
direct effect, an increase in the rate of time preference of the
buyer is detrimental to him in that it shrinks the range of the
parameters for which the seller plays soft in the first period.
5. The seller may be made better off when one period is
added to the bargaining process, even if he discounts the future.
Because he may be allowed to extract some of the surplus of the
high valuation buyer without losing the chance to sell to the
low valuation buyer.
Now for the tough seller, we have the following.
6. The outcome may be strongly inefficient. There may be no
trade after second period. So introducing and increasing horizon
may have different effects on the efficiency of the outcome.
t 7. Surprisingly, a decrease in the buyer's discount factor
may increase the buyer's payoff, even if we takes into account
the direct on welfare. The reason is that having a low discount
factor makes buyer b willing to accept high first-period offers,
this increasing the relative attractiveness for the seller of
seeking a compromise with buyer b compared to taking a tough
stance at the start. The crux of the problem is that buyer b
cannot commit himself to accept high offers if his discount
factor is high, and thus cannot prevent the seller from asking b.
Buyer b would like to offer to accept offers greater than b~, but
if the seller believed him buyer b would want to pretend to be
buyer b, refuse the offer and face offer b_in the second period.
8. Finally, whether the seller is tough or soft, at least
one of the potential players (seller, two types of buyer) is not
made worse off when a second period is added to the process. If
the seller is soft, he charges b_ in the one-period process; and
as he is free to charge b, which is accepted in the first-period
of the two-period process. So he cannot be made worse off. If
the seller is tough, he plays b in the one-period process, so
that no buyer has a positive surplus; thus the buyer cannot be
worse off in the two-period process and buyer b may be made
better off. The tough seller may be worse off in the cases where
he chooses b_ or b, and may be worse off or better off in the
cases where he chooses b~.
If both seller and buyer have incomplete information about
the other, there exist multiple equilibria in this model. But
according to Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987), unique equilibrium
can be obtained with alternate offers under two-sided incomplete
information.
After studying some models of the one seller-one buyer
bargaining process, we now come to study models which concern
with more than one player in either side.
One model is presented in Riley and Zeckhauser (1983). The
aim of the model is to show that for a seller encounters risk-
neutral buyers one at a time, he should quote a single take-it-
or-leave-it price to each if commitments are feasible.
The model is formulated as follows: A series of buyers will
enter the seller's showroom until a sale is made or the object is
withdrawn. The buyer has no cost to stay for another offer from
the seller. Buyers are risk-neutral and maximize their expected
consumer's surplus, the difference between their reservation
prices and the price they pay. The seller is risk-neutral and
maximizes expected profit.
The seller is assumed able to make a commitment to employ
Iany strategy he wishes, and he conveys this commitment to each
buyer. In choosing his strategy, the seller compares the ways
buyers with different reservation prices will respond to each
strategy. Knowing a buyer's optimal strategy in response to a
commited seller strategy, one can compute the probability of sale
and the expected price conditional upon sale.
t Except for announcing a single take-it-or-leave-it price,
haggling is also possible. There are two reasons why haggling
might prove beneficial. First, it allows the seller to price
discriminate. Second, valuable information about the
distribution of reservation prices can be obtained by adpoting
some form of discriminatory pricing strategy over time. But
there exists primary cost of haggling: It encourages buyers to
refuse a high price in the type of getting a lower one. So it
may make take-it-or-leave-it strategy to be optimal.
We have the following assumptions for the model.
A1. A single objects is offered for sale.
A2. It costs an amount z to bring a new buyer into the store.
A3. Recall of the buyers is not permitted.
A4. Current information about the reservation price of the next
buyer is summarized by a continously differentiable distribution
function F(v), such that F(0)=0 and F(l)=l.
A5. The distribution function F(v) is unaffected by the seller's
strategies.
The seller's strategy is defined as S. Once S is announced,
the buyer selects his optimal response B. This response depends
on his reservation price as well as the seller's strategy. Thus
B=bs(v). Then the expected return to a response B' can be
expressed as follows: {Expected buyer gain}={probability sale is
made} x [{reservation price}-{expected price
And the implied probability of sale HS(B') and expected price
Ps (Bt') conditional upon there being a sale. So we can write
H(v')= Hs(bs(v'))
P(v')= ps(bs(v'))
The expected buyer gain, if his response is B'=bs(v') and





Since we have defined B=bs(v) to be the buyer's optimal response,
it must be that 0(x,v) takes on its maximum at x=v. Also,
0(x,v') takes on its maximum at x=v'. Then each of the bracketed
expressions must be nonnegative. Thus the probability of sale
function H(v) must be nondecreasing so we may interpret it as a
distribution function. We assume that the buyer are honest and
0(x,v) is maximized at x=v. Then 0(v,v)=H(v)(v-p(v)), is the
maximized expected buyer gain. Since 0(x,v) is continuous in v,
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The expected payment by a buyer with reservation price v is
rL
the probability of a sale times the expected price conditional






But, as far as the seller is concerned, v and hence H(v)p(v)
is random variable with density f(v). Then the expected revenue








Integrating the second term by parts, we have finally
Expected seller revenue
-j
H(V) i (x f(v)dv 0(0,0
where j(v)=v-(1-F(v))f(v) and we require that 0(O,O)C
It remains to incorporate the expected gains to the seller
in the absence of a sale to the current buyer. Once a buyer has
been told he will not be sold the object, he has no incentive to
conceal his true valuation. We therefore assume that if the
buyer is not sold the object, he reveals to the seller his
reservation price. Using information accumlated to date, the
seller computes the expected profit p(v) from attempts to sell to
future customers. Since l-H(v) is the probability of not selling
to the. current customer if his reservation. price is v, so the




So the expected total profit is






The bracketed terra is the expected profit if the current customer
is told that no circumstances will he be sold the product.
Therefore, the final terra is the increment in expected profit
associated with the attempt to sell to this customer. A
necessary condition for the maximization of expected seller
profit is that H(v) is chosen to maximize this increment. Denote




We now ask what distribution function H (v) maximizes II'.
Proposition 1. The optimal selling strategy is an implied
probability of sale function H(v) of the form,
H(v)=Q if vv; 1 if v
where v is a root of j(v)=p(v).
Proof. Let k(v)=(j(v)-u(v))f(v), so II H(v)k(v)dv
o
Given assumption A4, j(v) is negative at v-0. Moreover, the
seller always has the option of giving up his search for a buyer.
Therefore, the expected profit from future attempts to sell the
product p(v) must be nonnegative. It follows that k(v) is
negative at v=0. As a first step in solving for the optimal
function H(v), consider all the right-hand endpoints of
subintervals over which k(v) is positve. Since H(v) is an
increasing function, if it is zero at every such point, the
integral II' must be nonpositive. Then if search is worthwhile,
there must be some smallest right-hand endpoint c such that H(c)
is positive. And we let b such that k(v) is positive on (b,c]
and a point a such that k(v) is negative on (a,b). Then we can












Since k(v) is negative on (a,b), II' is maximized by setting
H(v)=0 on this subinterval. Similarly, since k(v) is positive
on (b,c), it is optimal to make H(c) as large as possible on this
subinterval. But for H(c) to be a distribution function, it must
be non-decreasing. Then H(v)=H(c) on (b,c). Now let H(e) be
the optimal value of H at e, the right-hand endpoint of (d,e),
the next subinterval over which k(v) is positive. Arguing as
above, it follows that we should make H(v) as small as possible
over (c,d) and as large as possible over (d,e). Combining
results, we have
H(v)=0 if vb: H(c) if bvd: and H(e) if dve.











If the first integral is negative, II' is maximized by setting
H (c)=0. Since this contradicts the definition of c, the
integral must be nonnegative. Then II is maximized by setting
H (c) as large as possible, or H(c)=H(e). The optimal
distribution thus has a single step over interval (0,e).
Finally, we applies this argument for each additional subinterval
over which k(v) is single signed. Therefore, there is but a
single step at v=c, and 11= H(c) f k(v)dv.' It follows that if
searching for a buyer is optimal, II'0, H(c)-must be equal to
1. So an optimal strategy is one in which a sale is made iff the
current buyer has a reservation price vv. We have therefore
shown that; under the assumptions of this basic model it never
pays to haggle over price. Also, it can be shown that if the
only information to the seller is whether a buyer will accept or
reject his asking price, the take-it-or-leave-it-price pricing
strategy dominates any probabilistically declining asking price
strategy.
Now we study the model in Fudenberg,D., D.Levine, and
J.Tirole (1987). In this model, the seller is uncertain about
the buyer's valuation, and becomes more pessimistic over time.
When the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic, she prefers the
outside opportunity, so she will not bargain indefinitely with
the current buyer. Despite the resulting finite horizon nature
of negotiations, the link between the buyer's willingness to
accept an offer and the seller's eagerness to go outside
generates multiDle eauilihria
In the many-buyer model, the seller bargains with one buyer
at a time, and makes all the offers. At any time the seller may
break off negotiations in order to bargain with someone else.
If the seller can costlessly switch buyers, it will be shown
that the outside opportunity may allow the seller to commit to a
fixed price.
In this equilibrium, the seller switches buyers over time.
Depending on the parameters, there may also exist an equilibrium
in which the seller charges a price that is certain to be
accepted, and does not switch buyers if this price is
unexpectedly refused.
Also, the case in which the seller faces an additional delay
cost in switching buyers is considered. Because of this cost the
seller must become sufficiently pessimistic before switching
buyers, so that the take-it-or-1eave-it strategy may not be
credible. In this case the equilibrium may involve haggling:
the seller initially makes a high offer; if this offer is
refused, the seller's equilibrium payoff drops, but he follows
with a lower offer to the same buyer before switching.
The model is a hybrid of finite and infinite-horizon
bargaining, in that it allows traders to continuous bargaining
indefinitely, but results in negotiations of finite length.
The model is formulated as follows: The seller has a single
indivisible object for sale. The seller derives no utility from
having the object in her inventory, and storage is costless. It
is common knowledge that the seller's valuation is zero. There
are an infinite number of ex ante identical buyers. Each buyer's
valuation b is known only to him. The buyer's valuations are
independently and identically distributed on the interval [b_,b],
b0„, according to the cumulative distrbution .function F(b), which
is common knowledge. The seller and the buyers have discount
factors Bg, Bg respectively.
Time is indexed by periods t=l,2 At time 1 the seller
begins to bargain with the first buyer by naming a price that the
buyer may accept or reject. If the buyer rejects, the seller has•»
the choice of making a second offer to the same buyer in period
2; or to break off negotiations with this buyer and begin
negotiations with another. If the seller does choose to switch
buyers, she must wait a lag of d (delay) periods before making
her next offer. If d=0, the seller can make an offer to the
second offer to the second buyer in period 2, so that switching
is costless. Thus, the seller makes all offers, and she cannot
negotiate with several buyers at once. We assume that the seller
cannot recall a buyer once having passed on to a new one.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is a (history-
contingent) sequence of prices and switching decisions for the
seller, of buyers' acceptances or refusals of the offers; and of
(updated) beliefs about the buyers' valuations satisfying the
usual optimality conditions and Bayes rule.
In this paper the authors will restrict attention to those
perfect Bayesian equilibria that are stationary and monotone.
Stationary means that the strategies used by the seller and
current buyer can depend only on events that have occurred
sincethis particular buyer arrived. Furthermore, if the seller's
beliefs about the buyer do not change from one period to the
nextt, then her offer does not change, either;. Monotoncity means
that the seller's (expected) equilibrium payoff at the beginning
of a period strictly decreases as the seller's beliefs about
pessimistic. And if the seller is restricted to strategies that
depend only on her current beliefs, and the buyer to strategies
that depend only on his value and the seller's latest offer, then
the equilibrium is stationary and monotone.
Now we analyse the case in which switching buyers is not
costly, so that d=0. We also assume that the circumlative
distribution function of buyers, F(b), is twice continuously
differentiable. Then there are at most two possible payoffs for
the seller in a stationary, monotone equilibrium, namely: (i) b_
and (ii) the payoff when the seller can commit herself to a
single take-it-or-leave-it price. The latter is always an
equilibrium payoff; and the former requires that b_ be
sufficiently large, and in particular, does not exist if b_equals
the seller's valuation of zero. For the no-switching
equilibrium, the seller charges b_ each period regardless of the
history of the game, and the seller never switches away from the
current potential buyer. The buyer of valuation b thus accepts
all offers p less than or equal to (l-BB)b+ BBb so the seller's
posterior beliefs after an offer of p is refused is
3(p)=(p-fiBk)(• A necessary condition for this equilibrium
is that the seller does not wise to choose a price above b, given
that b_is expected next period:
b maxn [p(l-F(q(p))+BRF(q(p))b
Condition is also sufficient. In a no-switching
equilibrium, buyers expects b_ next period and so will accept an
offer iff ba(n). Given this says that it is best for the
seller to charge b right now.
In switching equilibrium, the seller announces that she will
charges a single take-it-or-leave-it price p~ to each buyer, and
switch buyers until p~ is accepted. The buyer of valuation b
accepts all prices less than or equal to b. Since the seller
always switches buyers, her choice problem is stationary. So
from the theory of dynamic programming we know that the single-
period and multi-period optimizations are identical. Formally,
let Vs be the seller's value of one period; and Vgc be the
seller's value in multi-period programming:
Since Vg and Vgc satisfy the same necessary and sufficient
functional equation, they have the same solution(s). If F(p)0,
the solution of about equations is unique.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the fixed price to
satisfy exceed b_is maxn p(l-F(p))+BoF(p)b b.
Now we show that the above two types of equilibria (no-
switching and full-switching) generate all stationary monotone
equilibrium valuation for the seller. First, we observe that we
must have Vgb, since the seller can always charge b_ which will
be accepted. Next, we claim that in any stationary monotone
eqilibrium, if Vgb_, then the seller always switches buyers. If
the sellerwere not to switch when price pt was refused in period
t, the value of continuing with the old buyer would have to be as
least as that of facing a new one. But if pt is refused with
probability strictly between zero and one, by monotonicity the
seller is worse off striking with the old buyer than he was
before the offer was rejected; and by induction worse off then
when he first met the old buyer. However, by stationarity, the
new buyer is as good as the old one as he was initially. THus,
either, Pt+i=k or Pt refused with probability one. The
latter is impossible, for if the seller makes an offer that
everyone refuses, her beliefs do not change and he must make the
same offer again. Subsequently, it must be rejected again and
the seller's present value is zero, which contradicts Vgb0.
Next we compare the equilibrium outcomes with the case of a
single buyer. The condition for an equilibrium with price b
eauatioi is also necessary and sufficiently for an
equilibrium with price b_in the one-buyer case. Thus, when()
is not satisfied, the seller is at least as well off facing many
buyers. When() is not satisfied, the one-buyer equilibrium
will yield the seller a payoff greater than b_. However, this
value will not be greater than that if the seller could set a
fixd price against the single buyer, wh,ich in term is not
greater than the value when the seller can set a fixed price
against many buyers. Thus, again the seller is at least as
well-off. Also, if F(p)0, then a comparison of first-order
conditions show that the switching-equilibrium price is never
less than that with one buyer. Consequently, each buyer prefers
the seller to have no outside opportunities. This is very
natural because the outside opportunities put the seller in a
stronger bargaining position.
Also, depending on the parameter values, either the no-
switching equilibrium or the switching equilibrium can yield
greater expected total surplus. Furthermore, the expected total
surplus can be larger or smaller with many buyers than with one.
We now consider the case d0, so that switching buyers
imposes an extra delay cost on the seller. This cost means that
the seller must become sufficiently pessimistic about the
current buyer before she finds it worthwhile to switch, so that
the always-switch equilibrium exists for a smaller set of
parameter values. And haggling is possible.
It remains true that if no-switching equilibrium exists, it
is the same as the equilibrium with only one buyer. However, the
delay cost makes the seller less eager to switch, and thus the
no-switching equilibrium exists for more values of parameters.
With strictly positive but finite delay costs, the seller may
haggle for a while, becomes sufficiently pessimistic, and prefers
to switch desDite the delav cost.
ir In Shaked-Sutton (1984), the authors study bargaining with
one buyer (firm) offers to two sellers (workers) with insider
and outsider under complete information. As would be expected
with complete information, switching never occurs. But in this
paper, switching is possible. So the conclusion in Shaked-Sutton
(1984) changes if information is incomplete.'
Chapter III
The Model and Extensions
3 1 The Raoio
The basic model consists of three agents, one buyer and two
sellers. Each seller has an indivisible 2ood to sell.
The buyer has a valuation b on the goods and has discount
factor£-, t=0,l,2,..., 0B1. The sellers are of two types,
'hard 1 and 'soft'. The 'hard' type has valuation s, and the
'soft' type has valuation s_. We assume bss0 and the value of
all valuations are known by all agents. If disagreement occurs,
fr-«
thp hlT7£T 1 Q nnunf f Uli 1 1 Kn rrarr
The trading process is as follows: The buyer offers a
price, if the first seller accepts, the process terminates. If
the sellpr rejects, the buyer can give another offer which will
•-
be higher to this seller, until the seller, accepts. Or else, he
L
,
gives an offer to the second seller, then the first seller will
get out of the market. Since b-s0, it is better for the buyer
to make an agreement with any one of the seller.
The buyer is risk neutral. He maximizes his expected payoff
at anu mnmpnt in thp nrnoess.
Also, we assume that the sellers do not know the number of
sellers and the possible types of the other sellers. Since the
sellers do not know the number of the sellers, so they will not
know whether they are the last one, and give the true response,
i p if thp offer ?iven is hiffher or eaual to his valuation, he
must accept, otherwise, he will reject. So the buyer will only
give two types of offers, s or s_. And the 'hard' type sellers
accepts 3 and rejects s_, the 'soft' type sellers will accept
anH o-
So we can simply take the problem to be the buyer's decision
i-«
under uncertainty over time. Let p be the subjective probability
which the buyer assigns on the 'soft' type sellers, 0pl, then
the probability of 'hard' sellers is 1-p. The sellers are
assumed independent and ex ante identical. Therefore, the buyer
4-.
will give the same first offer to all sellers. So, combine the
above results, we can simply consider two cases: the buyer uses
a' stopping(S)' strategy, i.e., he gives s to all sellers, or a
'fixed-offer(F)' strategy, i.e., he first gives s_to all sellers
and if any seller rejects, he switches to the others until the
1 a ?t nnp
The expected payoff for 'S'(P(S)) at the beginning of th
process: P(S)=b-s.
The expected payoff for 'F' (P(F)) at the beginning of the
process: P(F)=p(b-s)+(l-p)B(p(b-s)+(l-p)6(b-s)).
Ther S (1) 'F (l-(l-p)2B2 )(b-s
r( 1+ f f h—
I ht— s h-cWn( 1—( 1— n 1 (3.1.1
So if (b-s)(b-sJp(l-(l-p)B), the buyer will choose th
'stopping' strategy. The first seller will get s no matter wha-
types he is, the second seller will get nothing. If (b-s)(b-sj
p(l-(l-p)6), the buyer will choose the 'fixed-offer' strategy,
the 'hard' type of the first seller will not get anything. If
(b-s)(b-s)=p(l-(l-p)B), both strategies will give the buver the
same expected payoff, the result is undetermined
So we have the following Drooosition
Proposition 3.1. If the sellers are independent and ex ante
identical, then the buyer has only two optimal strategies, one is
the 'stopping' and the other is the 'fixed-offer' strategy. The
choice of optimal strategy is determined by (3.1.1).
Notice that (b-s)(b-sj can be interpreted as the ratio of
payoffs for the buyer in making agreement with the two different
types of sellers. And p(l-(l-p)B) represents the effects of the
probability of meeting different types of sellers and the delay
cost after being rejected, so (3.1.1) represents the tradeoff for
the buyer in bargaining.
Since p(l-(l-p)B) is a nondecreasing function in p and£
(2) if p and B increase, the probability of using the 'fixed-
offer' strategy increases. This result can be explained by tha
if p increases, the subjective probability of meeting 'soft
seller(s) increases, then the expected payoff of using 'fixed-
offer' also increases. If B increases, the buyer is less eagei
to buy, so the probability of using 'fixed-offer' also increases,
Also, for comparsion, we work out the results in one buyer-
one seller case. The expected payoff for' S' (P(S)) at the
beginning of the process: P(S)=b-s. And the expected payoff for
if~'(p(F~)) at the beginning of the process: P(F~)=p(b-
+(l-p)B(b-s).
So. 'S'V - i_ i _v%
Note that the conditions for choosing different strategie
are the same in both cases. But if the 'fixed-offer' strategy i
chosen, the expected payoff in two-sellers case is greater.
This model can extend in various directions, such as th
cases with many sellers, with many buyers, with differed
discount cost structure of buyers, with switching cost, wit!
multi-ty.pe sellers, with ex ante non-identical seller, witt.k
identical seller, with risk averse buyers and the sellers ma]
makp strategic delav.
3 9 Manv Sellers
Let the number of sellers be n where n=2,3,4 Using th
similar argument in section (3.1), the buyer only has two optima
strategies, one is the 'stopping' strategy and the other i:
'fixad-offer' strategy.
The expected payoff for 'S' is: P(S)=b-s.
The expected payoff for 'F' is: P(F)=p(b-s
(l-p)B[p(b-s)+(l-p)B[p(b-;
l1_nRh-s
Thpn 'R'' F (1-(1-p)nBn)(b-s)
p(l+(l-p)B+(l-p)2B2+..





From above calculation, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. The choice of optimal strategy is
independent of the number of sellers if the sellers are
independent and ex ante identical.
Since the sellers are independent and ex ante identical, the
buyer cannot get more information from switching to new seller
after being rejected, the situation for the buyer is the same as
in bargaining with the first seller, so the choice of strategy is
-c~
»
independent of n, and if n tends to infinity, and (b-s)(b-sj
p(l-(l-p)B), the buyer sets a 'take-it-or-leave-it' offer.
This result is similar to those in Riley-Zeckhauser (1983) and
Fudenberg et al. (1987). So the buyer may continue to give the
fixed price without agreement with any sellers. It is different
from the infinite-horizon bargaining model with complete
information (Rubinstein (1982)) which will terminate at finite
a
time.
3. 3. Many Sellers with Switching Cost
In the previous case, we assume no cost for the buyer
t
switching from one seller to another. Now we consider the case
with switching cost. For simplicity, we assume that if the
buyer switches from one seller to another seller, he must wait
for one more period. Due to the switching cost, the buyer may
continue to haggle with current seller instead of switching to
another. Since we assume that the seller are ex ante identical,
so if the buyer haggles with a seller, he must first haggle with
the first one. Now, the buyer has three optimal strategies, the
'stopping' strategy, the 'fixed-offer' strategy, and the
'haggling with the first seller(H)' strategy.
Theexpected payoff for 'S' is: P(S)=b-s.
The exDected Davoff for 'F1 is: P(F)=D(b-s
h( l-p)B2[p(b-sJ+( l-p)B2 [p(b-sJ+( l-p)B2 [p(b-:
hM-rOBrnfb-sl+ fl-DlBf b-s) 1... 1.
The expected payoff for 'H' is: P(H)=p(b-sJ+ (l-p)B(b-§]
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So the buyer chooses 'S' iff (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) hole
Since p(l-(l-p)B)p(l-(i-p)nB2n]
{(l-(l-p)nB(2n ))(l-(l-p)B2)}(4), so the condition for choosing
' stonDi np-1 stratpo-v ic f h-o K_o n f 1_ m o
For the buyer chooses 'F' iff both (3.3.1) and (3.3.3) doe
not hold without equalities.
Oi+ -i o2 i -i_ n r 9n
{(l-(l-p)ns(2n 1))(l-(l-p)B2)}(5), so the condition for choosinj
'fixed-offer' strategy is fb-s)(b-s)DB(l-(1-d}B2K
Also, the buyer chooses 'H' iff (3.3.3) holds and (3.3.
does not hold without equality. I.e., p(l-(l-p)B)(b-s)(b-s
..--. v« 9 V
Proposition 3.3. There exists some circumstances such tha
A
the buyer will haggle with the current seller, which ar
different from the cases without switching cost. In the latte
ra?p fhp hnvpr nn 1 v hacrcrl p with thp 1 qpI 1 pt
This result is consistent with that in Fudenberg e
al.(1987). Also, as compared with section (3.2), only th
'haggling' strategy which is independent of the number of seller
is added, so as an extension of section (3.2), the choose c
strategies is independent of n, as would be expected. When
tends to infinity, if pB(l-(l-p)B2), as in section (3.2), tl
buver iririv nontiniiR t.o pi vp thp fivpH nn' pp tiiT+Vinnt
3.4, Many Sellers and Two Buyer
Now, there are two buyers, and n2 sellers. The buyers have
4
the same valuation b and assign the same subjective probability p
on the 'soft' type sellers. Both have the discount factor B,
where t are the number of offers which each buyer has given. For
simplicity, we assume the following special trading process. It
is sequential, i.e., the first buyer gives the offer to the first
seller. If the seller accepts, the process terminates. And if
the seller rejects, the second buyer then can give the offer to
him or the second seller. If the second buyer gives the offer to
the second seller, the first seller will get out of the market.
If the second seller accepts the offer given by the second buyer,
the process teriminates. If the second seller rejects, and the
first buyer will have the opportunity to give the offer to him or
the third seller. If the first buyer gives the offer to the
third seller, the second seller will get out of the market. And
the process will continue as above. We assume also that the
bargaining results are known to both buyers, and the buyers are
independently making the decisions without consideration of the
other buyer's actions. Notice that since all sellers are ex ante
identical, the buyers give an 'high' offer to the previous seller
who has rejected the offer is equivalent to give this offer to a
new seller. So we simply assume that the buyers will give the
offer to the new one.
Then there are two different cases, n is odd or even,
When n is even, the expected payoff for the first buyer
using the 'stopping' strategy is: P(S1)=b-s.
The expected payoff for the 'fixed-offer' strategy is:
P(F1)=p(b-sJ+(l-p)B[p(b-sJ+(l-p)B[p(b-s
(l-p)B[p(b-sJ+(l-p)B(b-s)]...]=p[l+(l-p)B+(l-p)2B2+..
(l-p)(n42-l)fl(n2-l)] (b-sj+ [(l-p)n2Bn2] (b-s)
{p(l-(l-p)n2Bn2)(l-(l-p)B)}(b-sJ+(l-p)n2Bn2)(b-s
So for the first buyer
'Si1'Fx (b-s)(b-sj
p(1-(1-p)B
And for the second buyer, the expected payoff of the
stopping' strategy is: P(S2)=b-s.
The expected payoff of the 'fixed-offer' strategy is:
P(F2)=p(b-sJ+(l-p)B[p(b-sJ+(l-p)B[p(b-sJ
(l-p)B[p(b-sJ1...]={p(l-(l-p)n2Gn2)(!-(l-p)B)}(b-sJ
So for the second buyei
S2''f2 b-s)(b-s
p(i-(i-p)n2an2)(i-(i-p)B
So, if (b-s)(b-sjp(1-(l-p)B), then the first buye
chooses 'stopping' strategy and the first seller will get s n
matter what types he is. In this situation, the first 'soft
seller gets benefit. If p(l-(l-p)B)(b-s)(b-sJ
p(l-(l-p)n2Bn2)(l-(l-p)B), then the first buyer will choosi
'fixed-offer' strategy and the second buyer will choos
'stopping' strategy, so if the first seller is 'hard', then th
second. seller will get s from the second buyer no matter wha
types he is. In this situation, the second 'soft' seller get:
benefit. If (b-s)(b-s_)p(l-( l-p)11112)(l-( l-p)B), then botJ
buyers will choose 'fixed-offer' strategies, except the las
seller, orfly the 'soft' type sellers can make agreement. As i
increases, p(1-(1-p)n2Bn2)(1-(1-p)B) increases, th
probability for second 'soft' seller getting benefit decreases
and the probability for the last 'soft' seller getting benefi
increases.
When n is odd, the expected payoff for the first buyer using
'stopping' strategy is: P(S1)=b-s.
The expected payoff for the 'fixed-offer' strategy is:
P(F1)=p(b-sJ+ (l-p)B[p(b-s)+ (l-p)B[p(b-s)+..
+ (l-p)B[p(b-sJ ]...]=p[l+ (l-p)B+(l-p)2B2+...
+(l-p)(n-1)2Bn~12(b-sJ]...]
={D(1-(1-p)(n+l)2B(n+l)2)(1-(1-p)B)}(b-s
So for the first buver.
And for the second buyer, the expected payoff of the
stopping' strategy is: P(S2)=b-s.
The expected payoff of the 'fixed-offer strategy is:
P(F2)=p(b-sJ+(l-p)B[p(b-sJ+ (l-p)B[p(b-sJ+
+(l-p)B[p(b-s)+(l-p)B(b-s)]...]={p(i-(i-p)(n-l)2B(n-l)2)
(l-(l-p)B)} (b-sj+ (l-p) (r-l)2B(n-l)2(b-s).
So for the second buyer
If (b-s)(b-sjp(l-(l-p) (n+1)2B(ni1)2)(l-(l-p)B), the
first buyer uses 'stopping' strategy and the first seller gets s.
In this situation, the first 'soft' seller gets benefit. Since
p(l-(l-p)B)p(l-(l-p) (n+1)2B(n+1)2)(l-(l-p)B), then if the
first buyer uses 'fixed-offer' strategy, the second buyer must
also use 'fixed-offer' strategy. If (b-s)(b-sj
p(l-(l-p) (n+;1-)2B(n+;1-)'2)(l-(l-p)B), then all the 'hard' type
sellers, except the last one, will not get any agreement with the
two buyers. As n increases, p(l-(1-p)(n+l)2ft(n+l)2)(l-(l-p)B)
increases, the probability for the first 'soft' seller getting
benefit decreases, and the probability for the last 'soft' seller
getting benefit increases.
Combining the odd and even cases, the probability for las1
'hard' seller getting agreement increases and the 'soft' selle]
getting benefit as the number of sellers increases. This can be
explained by that as the number of sellers increases, the
expected payoffs for both buyers increase, so the probability foi
them to make 'fixed-offer' increases.
1 As n tends to infinity, in both odd or even n, th
conditions for both buyers using the 'fixed-offer' strategy wil
be the same, i.e., (b-s)(b-s)p(l-(l-p)B). So, as in the on
buyer cases, there exists situation that both buyers continue t
give the 'fixed-offer' without any agreement.
n R Manu SpI 1 prs and Manv Rnvpr?:
Now we extend the number of buyers to 1 with 12 and the
number of sellers is n2. Both 1 and n are finite.
The trading process is similar to the previous case, in this
case all 1 buyers will give an offer sequentially in the order
from 1 to 1 and the process is repeated until an agreement is
made. All buyers know all the results of bargaining and are
independently making the decisions without consideration of the
other buyers' actions.
If ln+l, since if all n sellers reject the offers given by
the first n sellers, then the (n+l)-th buyer will give s to the
first seller for b-lX), and the process terminates. So the
(n+2)-th to 1-th buyers will have no chance to give an offer.
And we only need to consider the case where n+ll2
If l=n+l, for any buyer k, the expected payoff of the
'stopping' strategy is: P(Sj)=b-s. And for any buyer k, 0kn,
the expected payoff of the 'fixed-offer' strategy is:
P(Fk)=P(k~§J. So if (b-s)(b-s_)p, the first buyer gives s to
the first seller, the first seller accepts, and the process
terminates. If (b-s)(b-sjp, all first n buyers choose the
'fixed-offer1 strategy, and all 'hard' tyfre sellers cannot get
anything except the last one. If all sellers are of 'hard' type,
the last seller will get S given by the (n+l)-th buyer.
When 0ln, for all buyers k, the expected payoff of
'stopping-1 strategy is: P(S)=b-s. Let n=z mod 1, for 0kz,





So for these buyers,
p(l-(l-p)(n+21-z)1B(n+21-z)1)(l-(l-p)B)
For k=z+l, the expected payoff of 'fixed-offer' strategy is:




So for the (z+l)-th buyer,
sz+l''l?z+l (b-3)(b-s)
p(l-(l-p)B)
For lkz+l, the expected payoff of 'fixed-offer' strategy
is: P(Fk)=p(b-s)+ (l-p)B[p(b-sJ+ (l-p)B[p(b-sJ+
+(l-p)B[p(b-sJ]...]={p(1—{1—p)(n_z)lg(n-z)I)(l—(l—p)Q)(b-sj
So for these buyers,
V'k (b-s)(b-s)
{p(l-(1-p)(n-z)lB(n-z)l)}(!_(l-p)B)
If (b-s)(b-sjp(l-(l-p)(n+21 z)lB(n+21 z)I)(i-(i-p)g)
then the first buyer uses 'stopping' strategy, the first seller
will get'-s and the process then terminates. Since
p (1- (l-p) (n+21-z) i|j (n+21-z) i)(_( i-p)B) p (1— (1—p)II), so if
the first z buyers use 'fixed-offer'strategy, then the (z+l)-th
buyer will also use 'fixed-offer' strategy. If
p(l-(l-p)(n+21-z)1Bn+21-z)1)(l-(l-p)B)(b-s)(b-sJ
{p( 1-(l-p)' n~z' •'•B (n_z)} (1-(1 -p) B), then the first z+1
buyers choose 'fixed-offer' strategies and the (z+2)-th buyer
will choose 'stopping' strategy. -The first z+1 sellers may get s_
if they are 'soft', and nothing if they are 'hard'. If all the
first z+1 sellers are of 'hard' type, the (z+2)-th seller will
get s which is given by the (z+2)-th buyer. If (b-s)(b-sj
:p (1-(l-p) n-z)lft(n-z)l l-(l-p)fi all buyers will use
fixed-offer1 strategies and except the last seller, only the
soft' types may make the agreement. If all the sellers are
'hard', the last seller will get s which is given by the (z+l)-th
seller.
3.6. Fixed Discount Cost
An alternative structure of discount cost of buyer has also
been used in the bargaining models. It is the fixed discount
cost ct, where c0 is a constant and t=0.1.2...
t In two sellers and one buyer case, the expected payoff for
stopping' strategy is: P(S)=b-s. And the expected payoff for
fixed-offer1 strategy is: P(F)=p(b-s)+(1-p)fp(b-s-c)
(1-p)(b-s-2c)




We have the following proposition
Proposition 3.6. Under the fixed discount cost, the choice
of optimal strategies is given by (3.6.1).
Notice that (s-sj is the difference between the valuations
of the two different types of sellers, and {(l-p)p}c represents
the effects of the probabilities of meeting different types of
sellers and the delay cost for the buyer. So similar to
(3.1.1), (3.6.1) represents the tradeoff for the buyer in
bargaining.
3.7. Fixed Discount Cost and Manv Sellers
Now let the number of sellers be n, n=3,4, For the
expected payoff of the 'stopping' strategy is: P(S)=b-s. The
expected payoff of the 'fixed-offer' strategy is:
P(F)=p(b-sJ+(1-p)[p(b-s-c)+(l-p)[p(b-s-2c:
+(l-p)[p(b-s-(n-l)c)+(1-d)fb-s-nc)1...1.











Proposition 3.7. As same as in discount factor case, th«
choice of optimal strategy is independent of the number ot
col 1 OTC
But if the number of sellers tends to infinity, the discount
cost also tends to infinity, then the buyer's expected payoff for
bargaining becomes negative and the buyer will not continue to
bargain due to individual rationality. So c must be less than
(b-s)n, and the case for infinite sellers is meaningless. So
the bargaining process must terminate at finite time.
3.8. Multi-types Sellers
Now the possible types of the sellers are extended to more
than two. The valuations for the sellers are s, S2,...,sm, where
the number of types is m, and bS2s2...sm0. The other
assumptions of the basic model still hold. Since the offers
given by the buyers depend on the expected return from different
types of sellers, if the number of types of sellers is too great,
the characterization of the optimal strategies will be very
t-«
complex. .Simple and explicit conditions of equilibrium cannot be
given but some general characterization may be stated out.
First, since all sellers are ex ante identical and
independent, the buyer assigns the same subjective probability on
•.ft
them, so the buyer must give the same first offer to all sellers.
Second, since switching cost is zero in this case, the buyer
must use 'fixed-offer' strategy without haggling with any sellers
except the last one( the 'stopping' strategy can be taken as a
kind of 'fixed-offer' strategy such that all sellers do not
reject). The claim can be shown as follow: First, we have
already argued that the buyer must give all sellers the same
first offer. So, we only need to show that the buyer will not
give two or more offers to the same sellers.
For the buyer gives an offer s to a seller k, the seller k
rejects, if the buyer gives a higher offer Sj to him, then this
is equivalent to that the buyer gives Sj_ to the seller k and then
gives s-; to the seller because for there exists no switching
cost. This gives contradictic
Third, since we assume that the difference between the
buyer's valuation b and the valuation of the 'hardest' type of
the seller is greater than zero. So the buyer will haggle with
the last seller until an agreement is made.
So, the strategies for the buyer are in the form of giving e
fixed-offer, if any sellers rejects, then switches to anothe]
sellers until an agreement is made, if all sellers reject th(
offer, then haggles with the last seller.
3.9. Strategic Delay of Sellers
Now if the seller knows the possible types of the other
sellers and the number of sellers, he may make strategic delay,
i.e. though he is of the 'soft' type, he rejects the lower offer.
v•.
So the response of the seller to the first offer may make no
information above his own type. And the buyer cannot make
certain that the sellers will make strategic delay. Now, for
simplicity, we assume that a seller has no knowledge about the
strategies of the other sellers. He makes strategic delay simply
because it is profitable for his own. The buyer assigns a
probability value q on the event that the seller does not make
strategic delay. The buyer has only two optimal strategies, the
'stopping' and the 'fixed-offer' strategy.
If all sellers are assumed to make strategic delay, the
expected payoff of the buyer using 'stopping' strategy is:
Thp PYHPnfH rprnf f nf 1 f 1-•~
P(F)=pq(b-sJ+(l-pq)B[pq(b-sJ+(l-pq)B[pq(b-
4- M -nrr R f nrt( h-c 4- M -r»rr ft( K_c 1 1
(b-s)f b-s1do(-(1-no)R
t
Another possible circumstance may occur if the buye
announces to the sellers that he uses only the two strategic
before the sellers make decisions. Then the sellers except th
last one will not make any strategic delay because they knc
4a.
that, as 'soft' type sellers, they will get nothing if they us
the strategy and get s_ if they agree with the buyer. Now th
expected payoff of the buyer using the 'fixed-offer' strateg










{(l-(l-p) (n-Du0-1) (l-pq)) (l-(l-p)B)]
Proposition 3.9. The expected payoff of the 'fixed-offer'
strategy is greater with buyer's announcement than in the case
without buyer's announcement, so the possibility of using 'fixed-
offer' strategy in the former case is greater.
As n tends to infinity, in the case without announcement,
the condition for choosing 'fixed-offer' strategy is (b-s)(b-sj
pq(1- (1-pq) B). And in the, case with announcement, the
condition for choosing 'fixed-offer' strategy is (b-s)(b-sj
p(l-(l-p)B), which is independent of q. This can be explained
by the fact that if n tends to infinity, there exists no 'last'
seller, all sellers will not make strategic delay and so the
condition is the same as in section (3.2).
3.10. Strategic! Dpi av nf ,9p 1 1 pre W1 1-h t-rh i ntr Priest
If there exists switching cost in the trading process, the
buyer may haggle with the first seller as argued before. Follow
from section (3.9), the expected payoff for this strategy is:
P(H)=pq(b-sJ+ (l-pq)B(b-s). The expected payoff for the 'fixed-








' H'' I (b-s)(b-s)
DaB(l-(1-do)B2 (3.10.3
So, the buyer chooses' P' iff (3.10.1) and (3.10.2) hold.
I.e., (b-s)(b-s_)pq(l-(l-pq)B). For the buyer chooses 'F' iff
both (3.10.2) and (3.10.3) do not hold without equalities. I.e.,
(b-s)(b-s_)pqB(l-(l-pq)B2). Also, the buyer will choose 'H'
iff (3.10.3) holds and (3.10.1) does not hold without equality.
I.e., pq(l-(l-pq)B)(b-s)(b-sJpqB(l-(l-pq)B2).
Also, if the buyer announces to the sellers that he uses
only the three strategies. Since the buyer only haggles with the
first and the last sellers, the sellers, except the first one and
the last one, will lose in making strategic delay. Now, the
expected payoff for the 'fixed-offer' strategy becomes:
P(F=nn(b—+ f 1— nrr f nfh-cl
( 1-D) B2 (n f b-R)+( l-nlRfnnlh-Ql+ f 1 -nrr ft( h—
=[pq+p(l-pq)B2(l-(l-p)(n 2)(2n-4))(
f-pq(l-pq)fi(2n2) (1-p) (n-2)i (b-s)+(1-pq)2(1-p) (n-2)B(2n-2) (b_£
Proposition 3.10. In this situation, the expected payoff
for the 'stopping' and the 'haggling' strategies are the same as
in the case without announcement, and the expected payoff for the
'fixed-offer' strategy is greater, so the possibility of using
'fixed-offer' strategy will increase as the same in section
(3.9).
3.11. Strategic Delay of Sellers and Two Buyers
Now we take the case of two buyers and two sellers. The
i
trading process is the same as in section (3.4), the buyers will
give offer to a new seller rather than an old one if the return
are the same. The sellers know that both buyers have only two
strategies. Then the first seller will not make strategic delay
and the second one will because the second seller will be
recalled by the first buyer.
t So the expected payoff of the fiij'st buyer using the
'stopping' strategy is: P(S1)=b-s. And the expected payoff of
the first buyer using the 'fixed-offer' strategy is:
P(F-i )=p(b-s)+(l-p)B(b-s).
Then. 'S-.'' F-. (b-s)(b-s)d(l-(1-d)B
The expected payoff of the second buyer using the 'stopping'
strategy is: P(S2)=b-s. And the expected payoff of the second
buyer using the 'fixed-offer' strategy is: P(Fo)=pq(b-s).
Then 'S2''F2 (b-s) (b-s_)pq
So if (b-s)(b-sJp(l-(l-p)B), the first buyer will give s
to the first seller, the seller accepts, and the process
terminates. If p(l-(l-p)B)(b-s)(b-sJpq, then the first buyer
will give s_to the first seller, if the first seller is of 'hard'
type, the second buyer will give the second seller s and the
process terminates. If (b-s)(b-sjpq, and both sellers reject s_,
then the second seller will be given s by the first buyer, so it
may be profitable for him to make strategic delay in this
situation. As compared with section (3.9), the second (last)
seller makes strategic delay in both cases, but the reason is
different. For the case in section (3.9), he haggles with the
buyer, and for the case in this section, he is recalled by the
buyer. So the probabilities for the second 'soft' type seller




Until now the types of the sellers are assumed to be
•.
independent. But if all sellers are of the same type and this
fact is known by the buyer, and the buyer only does not know
exactly which type they are, then the strategies of the buyer
will be different. Now, we assume that the sellers have multi-
types, the number of types is finite, and there exists no
switching cost. For the buyer gives any offers to any sellers,
it is the same as he gives to one seller,so the situation is
equivalent to the buyer who is facing one multi-type seller. We
have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.12. If the sellers are identical, the buyer
will choose the 'stopping' or the 'ascending' strategies, and the
process must terminate in finite time.
First notice that the 'fixed-offer' strategy will not be
optimal since if one seller rejects the offer, the other must
reject. So the buyer either uses the 'stopping' strategy or an
'ascending' strategy. And the offers given will depend on the
ratio of the returns from two different types and the discountI
f artnr nf fho Kihto
If the number of sellers n is greater than the number of
types of the sellers m, since after giving m-1 offers, the buyer
must make certain about the type of the sellers, so the the
process must terminate in finite time for at most m offers given,
some sellers must have no chance to be given an offer.
Q 1 Q J? v— Q n+ q Mnn-. i An f i a o 1 Ca 1 1 awc
Until now, we have assumed that the sellers will not be
recalled after they have rejected the offers. This assumption is
V
not crucial -if the sellers are ex ante identical, the buyer will
not make any difference in the choice of strategies. But if the
sellers are ex ante non-identical, then the case that the sellers
can be recalled will be different. We take some simple cases for
further discussion. Let us have one buyer and two sellers, both
sellers may take one of two possible types, the first seller
called 'insider' has valuations s_j if he is 'soft' and §j if he
is 'hard'. The second seller called outsider' has valuations s
if he is 'soft' and sq if he is 'hard'. The buyer assigns the
same prior probability p to both 'soft' sellers. All the
valuations of both sellers are known by the buyer.
The trading process is as follows: The buyer gives an offe
to 'insider', if 'insider' accepts, the process terminates. I
'insider' rejects, the buyer can give an higher offer tc
'insider' or switches to 'outsider', if 'outsider' accepts, the
process terminates. And if 'outsider' rejects, he can give a
higher offer to 'outsider' or recall 'insider' until an agreement
is made. There are six different cases for different relations
of the valuations.
Case (i' In this ease, there mav be
three undominated strategies, the 'stopping' strategy, thi
'haggling' strategy and the 'switching and recalling(SR)
strategy.'• The expected payoff for the 'stopping' strategy is
P(S)=b-sj. The expected payoff for the 'haggling' strategy is
P(H)=p(b-sj)+(1-p)fi(b-sj). And the expected payoff for thi
'switching and recalling' strategy is: P(SR)=p(b-sj)
+(l-p)G[p(b-sD)+(l-p)B(b-sI)]=p(b-sJ)+p(l-p)B(b-s£
(l-p)2S2(b-sT).













So the buyer chooses 'S' iff both (3.13.1.1) and (3.13.1.2)
hold. I.e., (b-sj){p(b-sj)+p(l-p)B(b-s)}(1-(1-p)2fi2). And the
buyer chooses 'SR' iff both (3.13.1.2) and (3.13.1.3) do not hole
without equalities. I.e., (b-sj){p(b-sj)+p(1-p)B(b-s)}
(1-(1-p)2B2). And the buyer chooses 'H' iff (3.13.1.3) holds anc
4.$.
(3.13.1.2) does not hold without equality. I.e., {p(l-(l-p)B)}
(b-s_r)(b-sI){p(l-(l-p)B)} (b-S£,) which is impossible since
(b-sj)(b-sj0). So the buyer has only two optimal strategies, one
is 'stoDDing' and the other is 'switching and recalling'.
Case (ii): bs0s1sr)sj;0. As in case (i), the buyer has
three optimal strategies, one is 'stopping' strategy, one is
'haggling' strategy, and the 'switching and recalling' strategy.
The expected payoff of the 'stopping' strategy is: P(S)=b-sI.
The expected payoff of the 'haggling' strategy is: P(H)=p(b-sj)
+(1-p)B(b-sj). The expected payoff of the 'switching and
recalling' strategy is: P(SR)=p(b-Sj;)+ (l-p)B[p(b-si3)
+(l-p)B(b-sI)]. All the expected payoff are the same as in case
(i).
But in this case, (b-s_Q) (b-s_j), then the choice of
'haggling' is possible, and the condition for choosing 'S' is
(b-sI)p(l-(l-p)B)}(b-sr) The condition for choosing 'H' is
{P(l-(l-p)B)}(b-sn)(b-sT){p(l-(l-p)B)}(b-Si and the
condition for choosing 'SR' is b-sr){p l-(l-p)B)} b-sn
Case i i i i' bs Tsrjsjsn0 There are three undominated
strategies, the 'stopping' strategy, the 'switching and
stopping(SS)' strategy, and the 'switching' and haggling(SH)'
-strategy. The expected payoff for the 'stopping' strategy is:
P(S)=b-sj. The expected payoff for the 'switching and stopping'
strategy is: P(SS)=p(b-s_j)+ (l-p)B(b-s0). And the expected payoff









There exist two different cases, if p(b-sT)
(1 (1 p)B)(b-sj)+p(1-p)B(sj-sq)o, then the buyer chooses 'S'
iff (b-sg){(b-sx)~P(b-sj)-p(l-p)B(b—SJ3)}((l-p)2B2). The buyer
chooses 1SS' iff (h-sg){p(l-(l-p)B)}(b-sg). And the buyer
chooses 'SH' iff (b-s0)(l-(l-p)B)(b-sg){l(l-p)2B2}
[ (b-sI)-p(b-sI)-p(l-p)B(b-sJ3)]. If p(b-sj)-(l-(l-p)fl) (b-sj)
+ p(lrP)B(s_i-Sj3)0, the 'switching and haggling' will not be
optimal. The buyer chooses 'S' iff (b-s0){l(l-p)2B2}
[ (b-sj)-p(b-sj)-p(l-p)B(b-Sg)]. And he chooses 'SS' iff
(b-Sn){l(1— P)2B2 f (b-ST)-D(b-Sr)-D(l-D)B(b-Sn)].
Case (Iv): bsisQssj0 and case (v): bsjs_jsqs0
In both cases, the buyer has the same optimal strategies as i]
case (iii). The expected payoff of the 'stopping' strategy is
P(S)=b-sj. The expected payoff of the 'switching and stopping
strategy is: P(SS)=p(b-s_j)+ (l-p)B(b-sQ). And the expectec
payoff of the 'switching and haggling' strategy is:
P(SH)=p(b-§j;)+p(l-p)B(b-Sjo)+ (l-p)2B2(b-SQ). Notice that th
expected payoff of all strategies are same as in case (iii). Sc
the conditions for choosing alternative strategies will be the
same.
Case (vi): bsQssjs_j0. In this case, the buyer wil
only have two optimal strategies. The 'stopping' strategy anc
the 'haggling' strategy. The expected payoff of the 'stopping'
strategy is: P(S)=b-Sj.
And the expected payoff of the 'haggling' strategy is
P(H)=p(b-sj)+(l-p)B(b-sj). The buyer chooses the 'stopping
strategy iff (b-sT)(b-sT)p(l-(l-p)fi).
In all cases, since the buyer can recall the sellers, he has
more opportunities to meet a seller with lower valuation, he must
be better off. Also, haggling and then switching is possible
which does not happen in ex ante independent and identical
sellers cases.
Proposition 3.13. If sj is the largest among all valuations
v
of sellers?, then the only optimal strategies for the buyer are
'stopping'., 'switching and haggling' and 'switching and
stopping'.
9 1 A PT-antP Nnn-iripntina1 Sellers with Switnhin? Cost
If there exist switching cost in the above cases, some
conclusions may be different. The switching cost structure is
the same as in section (3.3). For the cases (i) and (ii) in
section (3.13), since 'recalling' will have switching cost, so in
some circumstances, the optimal strategy for the buyer is
haggling with the 'outsider' without recalling the 'insider'.
The expected payoff for this strategy is: P(SH)=p(b-§j)
+(l-p)B2[p(b-S£,)+(l-p)B(b-s0)]. The expected payoff for the
'switching and recalling' is: P(SR)=p(b-Sj;)
+(1-p)fi2[p(b-sJ0)+(l-p)B2(b-sI)]. And the expected payoffs for
thP 'stoDDins' and 'haggling' strategies are the same as in
spntinn (3 1 3
And in cases (iii), (iv) and (v) in section. (3.13),
'haggling' with the 'insider' now becomes profitable for the
buyer. The expected payoff for the 'haggling' strategy is:
P(H)=p(b-sj)+ (1-p)B(b-sj). The expected payoff for the
'switching and stopping' becomes: P(SS)=p(b-§j)+(l-p)B2(b-s0).
And the expected payoffs for the 'switching and haggling'
becomes: P(SH)=p(b-Sj)+ (l-p)B2[p(b-SQ)+ (l-p)6(b-s0)]. The
expected payoff for 'stopping' strategy will be obvious the same
as in section (3.13).
In all five cases, the buyer has four optimal strategies and
the conditions for the buyer choosing alternative strategies will
become complex in this case. No simple conclusions can be given.
In the case (vi), the situation is much simplier, since the
buyer will not bargain with the 'outsider', the conditions will
be the same for the buver as in section (3.13).
3 15 Pi «5k Avpr55f» Rtrver with Manv Sellers
Assume the buyer is risk averse and has a special von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u where u' 0 and finite,
u0 and u(0)0. Then the expected payoff for the 'stopping'
strategy is: P(S)=u(b-s). And the expected payoff for the
'fixed-offer' strategy is:
P(F) =pu(b-sJ+( l-p)B[pu(b-s_)+( l-p)B[pu(b-s_]
J-( 1 —r» ft f niW h-5 1 4- (1 -n) 3u (b-s)!...!.
Then S'' F 1
u(b-s)u(b-s
p(l-(l-p)B)
Since u(x)x is a decreasing function, so u(b-s)u(b-s_)
(b-s)(b-sj, and the probability of using 'stopping' strategy is
greater for a risk averse buyer than a risk neutral buyer.
Notice that the above result may not(hold for general
utility functions.
3.16. Risk averse Buyer with Fixed Discount Cost
In this case, for simplicity, we assume that there are only
two sellers. -Similar to section (3.15), the buyer has a special
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u where u'0 and finite,
u0 and u(0)0. Then the expected payoff for the 'stopping'
strategy is: P(S)=u(b-s). And the expected payoff for the
'fixed-offer' strategy is:
P(F)=pu(b-sJ+p(l-p)u(b-sc)+(1-p)u(b-s-2c), for









(l-p) [pu' (b-sj +2 (l-p) u' (b-s)]
t
c( by intermediate theorem, there exist
b-sab-s_ s. t.
u'fa)fs-s)=u(b-s)-u(b-s).)
Notice that in this case, whether the probability of using
'stopping' strategy is greater or not will depend on the size of
,
u'(.) at a,b-s and b-s and has no simple conclusion, which is
different from the section (3.15). So the specification of




First notice that the roles of buyers and sellers can be
interchanged and the main results will be the same.
Although the model is highly simplified, we can get certain
results.
11: Since the buyer has incomplete information about the
types of sellers, he only assigns subjective probability on this
event. If the buyer use the 'stopping' strategy, the first
'soft' seller gets certain benefit due to the adverse selection.
Also, as p decreases, the probability of 'stopping' strategy
increases; ..and the probability for the 'soft' seller to get
benefit increases. This is the same as in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1983) and some other model with incomplete information.
2. Surprisingly, the condition for choosing 'stopping'
strategy and 'fixed-offer' strategy is the same in both one
seller and many sellers cases. But the expected payoff in
choosing 'fixed-offer' strategy is-greater in many sellers case
than in one seller case. So the buyer is at least as better in
many sellers case than in one seller case. This reflects the
intuition that the buyer has a stronger position with many
sellers. Also, the probability of getting s and s for the first
'soft' seller are the same in both cases. Thus, he is
indifferent in both situations. But the probability of getting
agreement for the first 'hard' seller is less in many sellers
case than in one seller case. Consequently, he is worse off.
3. The probability for the buyer using 'fixed-offer'
strategy increases as the discount cost decreases. This
reflects the intuition that as the buyer does not eager to buy,
he will choose a lower price.
4. If the sellers are ex ante independent and identical,
the tbuyer will not update his beliefs afterbeing rejected. The
strategy then is stationary, as compared with Fudenberg et.al
(1987). Also, the process may not terminate in finite time if
all sellers in fact are of the 'hard' type.
5. Since with switching cost, although all sellers are ext
ante independent and identical, the current seller becomes
'different' from the others. So haggling with the current
sellers is profitable. Also, the choose of the strategies is
independent of the number of sellers.
6. For more than one buyer, the probability of getting s
for the first seller is greater than with only one buyer if the
number of sellers is odd, and the same if the number of sellers
is even. Thus, the first seller is at least as better than
before simply because he is now in a stronger position. Also,
the former 'soft' sellers get less benefit and the probability
for the last 'hard' seller getting agreement increases as the
number of sellers increases.
7. In the multi-type sellers case, the conclusion is
similar to the one with two-type sellers. The buyer does not
haggle with current seller if there exists no switching cost
8. For the ex ante identical sellers, it is similar to the
case with one seller, so the ascending offer strategy is used and
there exists no 'fixed-offer' strategy.
9. Strategic delay is profitable for the seller only if the
buyer will haggle with him. So if the buyer announces his
strategies, the sellers will not try to make strategic delay if
they know that they will not be haggled by the buyer. So the
payoff for the buyer will be larger than without announcement.
And it is better for the buyer to announce his strategies to the
sellers. t
10. Jf there exist two buyers and' two sellers, the
subjective probability q of the buyer(s) to the event that the
sellers do not make strategic delay increases, the second (i.e.
the last) 'soft' seller get more benefit.
11. Recall is profitable only in ex ante non-identical
sellers. 'Haggling and switching' strategy is possible in this
case which is impossible in the ex ante independent and identical
rasp.
12. In all ex ante non-identical sellers cases, 'stopping'
strategy is one of the optimal strategies although the
reservation prices of the 'outsider' may be less than that of the
'insider'. This can be explained by the fact that the bargaining
process is sequential and the buyer will discount his payoff for
delay. Thus, with certain parameter values, the expected payoff
for 'stopping' is greater than the others. Also, if sj is the
largest among all the reservation prices of sellers, then the
only optimal strategies are the 'stopping', 'switching and
haggling' and the 'switching and stopping' strategy.
13. As the same in the ex ante independent and identical
cases, strategic delay for seller may be profitable only if he
will lbe haggled by the buyer even in the case with ex ante non-
identical sellers.
14. Specification of discount cost of the buyer(s) is not
crucial if the buyer is risk neutral. In the risk-averse buyer
case, for certain expected utility functions, if the discount
cost is in the form of discount factor, then the probability of
'stopping' strategy increases, compared with risk-neutral buyer
case. This is because the payoff of 'stopping' strategy is more
certain than that of 'fixed-offer' strategy. But in the fixed
discount cost case, the result is not so obvious, it will depend
on the shape of the expected utility function of the buyer.
So our simple models have captured several important
elements of bargaining and have some rather concrete results.
This feature is different from Fudenberg et al (1987). Where in
that paper, only very limited concrete results are given. But
some limitations of the models are worth mentioning.
1. Since the results involve comparisons between different
payoffs of the buyer(s) using different strategies, the infinite
and continuous types of sellers cannot be deal with.
2. Strategic behaviours of buyers and sellers are not fully
formulated. If the sellers' strategies depend on the others' or
the buyer's offers, then the beliefs of the buyers will become
very different, and the strategies of the buyers, of course, will
be different. Certain results mav have to be reviewed.
3. If both the buyers and the sellers can make offers, then
fr-•
the situations are completely different, then the strategic
behaviors of the~ sellers have to been formulated. The results
will be different.
4. Another problem is the information structure that we have
Vi.
assumed. ff both sides have incomplete information about the
ft.
other, then the assumptions of the beliefs of both sides are very
crucial (Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Rubinstein (1985)). Then
the concrete results of our models may not be obtained.
FOOTNOTES
1. For simplicity, I use 'A''B' to represent that strategy A is
Dreferred to stratep-v R.
2. See appendix i.
3. See appendix ii.
4. See appendix iii
Qdp annonH1Y Iu
Annendix T
In one buyer-one seller case, the expected payoff foi
1F1(P(F~)) at the beginning of the process: P(F~)= p(b-sj
+ (l-p)B(b-s). And the expected payoff for 'F'(P(F)) in the one
buver-t.wo sellers rase at the hecrinnincr nf the nrnre.j5«
P(F)= p(b-sJ+ (l-p)B(p(b-sJ+ (l-p)B(b-s)).
1 Then P(F)-P(F)= (l-p)B[p(b-sJ-(l-(l-p)B)(b-s)].
If the 'fixed-offer' strategy is chosen, (b-s)(b-s
p(1—(1—p)B), so P(F)P(F).
ADDendix II
To show p(l-(l-p)B) is an nondecreasing function in p, we














0 (0B1, 0plf (l-(l-p)(n-1)B(2n-2))Q)
Appendix IV
pB(l-(l-p)B2)
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